Author: Ignacio Castro 🇦🇷
Lawyer

The article is also available in French and Spanish:

Published and translated by the firm WD Associés    

1. Introduction

The regulation of football agents has been one of the most controversial issues in international sports law in recent years. The adoption of the FIFA Football Agent Regulations (FFAR, 2022) represented FIFA’s most ambitious attempt to establish a uniform regulatory framework for an activity that had, for decades, been criticized for its lack of transparency, high intermediary costs, and the absence of common standards.

However, the implementation of the Regulations gave rise to numerous legal challenges in several jurisdictions, particularly in Europe, where a number of football agents argued that several of its provisions restricted competition, limited the freedom to provide services, and infringed other fundamental principles of European Union law.

Against this background, the Regional Court of Mainz (Landgericht Mainz) referred a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in order to determine whether certain provisions of the FFAR were compatible with Articles 56, 101, and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, 2010), as well as with Article 6 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

The judgment delivered by the Court of Justice on 16 July 2026 (CJEU, 2026) constitutes one of the most significant sports law decisions of recent years. It not only addresses the compatibility of the FIFA Agents Regulations with EU law but also provides important guidance on the scope of the regulatory autonomy of international sports governing bodies and the limits that EU competition law may impose when sporting rules produce economic effects on the market.

The purpose of this article is to analyse the principal legal foundations of the Court’s decision, examine the reasoning adopted by the CJEU, and reflect upon the implications that this judgment may have for FIFA, other international sports federations, and, more broadly, for the development of contemporary sports law.

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2. Background to the Dispute

The FIFA Football Agent Regulations (FFAR)

With the stated objective of establishing a uniform regulatory framework for the activities of football agents, strengthening professional standards within the profession, and enhancing transparency in the transfer market, FIFA adopted the FIFA Football Agent Regulations (FFAR) on 16 December 2022 (FIFA, 2022).

The new Regulations introduced a comprehensive framework governing the activities of football agents, including, among other measures, a mandatory licensing system, caps on commissions, restrictions on multiple representation, transparency obligations, and duties relating to the processing of contractual and financial information.

The Regulations entered into force on a phased basis. While certain provisions became applicable in January 2023, FIFA announced that the Regulations would become fully effective as of 1 October 2023. However, only a few days before that date, German courts granted interim measures suspending their application in Germany, giving rise to the dispute that was subsequently referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union.

EU Flag | Photo: pixabay.com

The Parties and the Main Proceedings

The main proceedings involve, on the one hand, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and, on the other, FT, a football agent and Vice-President of The Football Forum, together with RRC Sports GmbH, a German company specialising in the representation of professional football players, of which FT is the Managing Director.

The applicants challenged the compatibility of several provisions of the FFAR with European Union law, arguing that the restrictions imposed by the Regulations could infringe the freedom to provide services, EU competition rules, and the European legal framework governing the protection of personal data.

The Preliminary Reference

In the course of the proceedings, the Regional Court of Mainz (Landgericht Mainz, Germany) decided to stay the proceedings and refer a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union, pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, 2010).

In essence, the referring court requested the CJEU to interpret Articles 56, 101, and 102 TFEU, as well as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), in order to determine whether certain provisions of the FFAR were compatible with European Union law.

The legal significance of the case extends well beyond the review of a specific regulation. The dispute requires the Court to define the limits of FIFA’s regulatory authority where its decisions have a direct impact on an economic market and to determine the extent to which European Union law may exercise judicial control over the so-called lex sportiva.

It is precisely this tension that lies at the heart of the judgment examined in this article.

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3. The Legal Framework of the Dispute

To understand the dispute brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), it is essential to identify the legal framework relied upon by the applicants. The challenge to the FIFA Football Agent Regulations (FFAR, 2022) extends beyond questioning certain regulatory decisions adopted by FIFA; it raises the issue of whether those provisions are compatible with the fundamental principles of European Union law, particularly in relation to the freedom to provide services, competition law, and the protection of personal data.

Freedom to Provide Services

One of the principal legal grounds of the action is Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, 2010), which guarantees the freedom to provide services within the internal market.

The applicants argue that the activities carried out by football agents constitute an economic service and that, consequently, any regulation restricting the exercise of that activity must be assessed in light of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by EU law. From this perspective, several provisions of the FFAR could unjustifiably restrict access to, or the exercise of, the profession of football agent within the European Union.

Competition Law

The central issue in the dispute revolves around Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (2010).

On the one hand, Article 101 prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings, and concerted practices that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the internal market.

In this context, one of the most significant legal questions is whether FIFA, despite being a non-profit association responsible for the organisation and regulation of world football, may be regarded as an “association of undertakings” for the purposes of EU competition law. The answer to this question is decisive, since the provisions of the FFAR can only be examined under Article 101 TFEU if FIFA falls within that definition.

On the other hand, the applicants also rely on Article 102 TFEU, arguing that FIFA’s institutional position within professional football may justify an assessment of certain provisions of the Regulations from the perspective of a possible abuse of a dominant position.

The Protection of Personal Data

The dispute also raises issues concerning the protection of personal data.

The FFAR requires football agents to submit and register contractual, financial, and professional information through platforms administered by FIFA. Accordingly, the applicants argue that such data processing must comply with the requirements laid down by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), particularly with regard to the existence of a valid legal basis for the processing and the protection of the rights of the individuals concerned.

The Specificity of Sport and FIFA’s Regulatory Autonomy

Finally, the dispute arises within the context of the specificity of sport, as recognised by Article 165 TFEU (2010).

FIFA maintains that, as the governing body of world football, it has the authority to adopt regulations intended to ensure the integrity, transparency, and proper functioning of the international transfer system.

However, the dispute raises a broader question: to what extent does that regulatory autonomy permit FIFA to adopt rules that directly affect an economic market such as that of football agents, and, consequently, what limits does European Union law impose on the exercise of that regulatory authority?

It is precisely this tension between the regulatory autonomy of sports governing bodies and the application of EU competition law that forms the basis of the analysis carried out by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the judgment examined in this article.

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4. The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the European Union

The judgment of the Court of Justice goes beyond resolving the dispute between the applicants and FIFA. It establishes a genuine methodological framework for determining when a privately adopted sporting regulation is compatible with European Union law. Before assessing the validity of the various provisions of the FIFA Football Agent Regulations (FFAR), the Court sets out a number of general principles that serve as the benchmark for examining each of those provisions.

FIFA as an Association of Undertakings

One of the first issues addressed by the Court is whether FIFA falls within the scope of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, 2010). The Court answers this question in the affirmative.

The Court recalls that the concept of an “undertaking” in EU competition law encompasses any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status or the way in which it is financed. Consequently, where several such entities are brought together within a common organisation, that organisation may be regarded as an “association of undertakings” for the purposes of Article 101 TFEU.

Statue of Justice | Photo: pixabay.com

Although the FIFA Football Agent Regulations were adopted exclusively by FIFA, the federation is composed of national football associations, which in turn bring together clubs and leagues engaged in economic activities across a variety of markets, including player recruitment, the commercial exploitation of rights, sponsorship, and ticket sales. Likewise, the intermediation services provided by football agents constitute a remunerated economic activity within the international transfer market.

On that basis, the Court concludes that FIFA acts as an association of undertakings and that the provisions contained in the FFAR constitute decisions adopted by such an association, thereby falling within the scope of Article 101 TFEU.

This finding is of considerable significance, as it rules out any possibility of automatically excluding FIFA’s regulatory decisions from the application of EU competition law.

The Specificity of Sport and the Limits of Article 165 TFEU

Another cornerstone of the judgment is the clarification of the so-called principle of the specificity of sport.

FIFA argued that sport possesses distinctive characteristics that justify a broad degree of regulatory autonomy. However, the Court recalls that Article 165 TFEU (2010) does not constitute a special provision exempting sport from the application of the other rules of primary EU law.

On the contrary, the particular characteristics of sporting activity must be taken into account only when applying EU law; they do not justify setting aside or neutralising either the fundamental freedoms or the rules of competition.

Only rules that are strictly sporting in nature, adopted exclusively for non-economic reasons and directly linked to the organisation of sporting competitions, may fall outside the scope of Articles 56, 101, and 102 TFEU. As examples, the Court refers to rules governing the composition of national teams or the qualification criteria for particular competitions.

By contrast, where sporting regulations affect economic markets—as is the case with the activities of football agents—they are fully subject to European Union law.

This conclusion further consolidates the line of case law established in Meca-Medina, subsequently developed in European Superleague, and now reaffirmed in relation to the market for sports intermediation services (CJEU, 2026).

The Analytical Framework Adopted by the Court

Before examining each of the contested provisions of the FFAR, the Court sets out the methodology to be followed in determining whether a particular regulatory measure infringes Article 101 TFEU (2010).

The first step is to determine whether the provision constitutes a restriction of competition by object. This category is limited to forms of coordination that, by their very nature, are sufficiently harmful to the proper functioning of the market, without the need to demonstrate their actual effects.

If the provision does not display such an inherent degree of harmfulness, the analysis must proceed to determine whether it constitutes a restriction of competition by effect, which requires an assessment of the relevant economic and legal context of the market concerned.

The Court emphasises that the concept of a restriction by object must be interpreted strictly and reserved only for situations in which the measure’s capacity to distort competition is manifest.

The Court also recalls that, under the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is not for the Court of Justice to make definitive findings of fact. Its role is limited to providing the interpretation of EU law. It is therefore for the Regional Court of Mainz (Landgericht Mainz), applying those interpretative criteria, to determine whether the specific provisions of the FFAR constitute restrictions incompatible with EU law.

The Assessment of the Main Provisions of the FFAR

Applying the above principles, the Court examines each of the groups of provisions challenged by the applicants (CJEU, 2026).

With regard to the rules governing multiple representation, the Court considers that they may reduce competition between football agents by limiting their ability to represent several parties involved in the same transaction simultaneously. Nevertheless, it concludes that this circumstance alone is insufficient to classify those rules as restrictions of competition by object. Instead, the specific characteristics of the market in which they operate must be examined.

As regards the caps on agents’ remuneration, the Court finds that the percentage limits established by the FFAR do not, in principle, constitute restrictions of competition by object. It notes that those caps do not impose a uniform level of remuneration but rather establish a proportional relationship between the agent’s fee and either the player’s salary or the value of the transfer. As such, they do not, in principle, eliminate economic incentives to compete.

The Court reaches the same conclusion in relation to the prohibition on third parties paying an agent’s fees, certain rules governing the calculation of commissions, and other provisions concerning the payment of remuneration. According to the Court, these measures require an assessment of their actual effects before they can be found incompatible with EU competition law.

However, the Court identifies one provision as particularly problematic: Article 14.12(a) of the FFAR (2022). According to the Court’s interpretation, this provision may automatically deprive an agent of part of the remuneration generated by a previous transfer where the player is transferred again before the expiry of the employment contract, even though that agent takes no part in the subsequent transaction. In the Court’s view, such a consequence could amount to a restriction of competition by object, as it arbitrarily affects the economic incentives inherent in the intermediation business.

With regard to the licensing regime, the Court distinguishes between provisions requiring agents to submit to FIFA’s regulatory framework, Swiss law, and the jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), on the one hand, and those establishing ethical and disciplinary requirements for obtaining or retaining a licence, on the other. In both cases, the Court concludes that these requirements do not, in themselves, constitute restrictions of competition by object, without prejudice to the assessment to be carried out by the national court in light of the specific circumstances of the case.

The Court also devotes particular attention to the restrictions relating to the so-called approach rules. It observes that preventing certain agents from contacting prospective clients until the final months of an existing representation agreement may favour agents who already enjoy an exclusive contractual relationship with those players or coaches, thereby distorting the competitive conditions of the market. Accordingly, the Court considers that these provisions possess characteristics that warrant examination as potential restrictions of competition by object.

Finally, with regard to the obligation to upload and publish information on FIFA’s digital platform, the Court distinguishes between the publication of historical data and the disclosure of strategically sensitive information. While acknowledging that much of this information may enhance market transparency, the Court leaves it to the national court to determine whether, in the specific circumstances of the case, such publication is capable of distorting competition or infringing the requirements of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

The Scope of the Court’s Decision

The judgment does not declare the FIFA Football Agent Regulations to be invalid in their entirety, nor does it replace the role of the national court (CJEU, 2026).

Rather, the Court of Justice performs the function entrusted to it under Article 267 TFEU: to interpret European Union law and provide the legal criteria necessary for the Regional Court of Mainz (Landgericht Mainz) to resolve the main proceedings.

Accordingly, it will be for the German court to determine, with respect to each of the challenged provisions of the FFAR, whether they constitute restrictions of competition by object or by effect, whether any such restrictions may be justified by legitimate objectives in the public interest, and whether they satisfy the applicable test of proportionality.

It is precisely this allocation of responsibilities that defines the true scope of the judgment. Far from invalidating FIFA’s regulatory framework in its entirety, the Court establishes a framework of judicial review that makes the exercise of FIFA’s regulatory powers subject to compliance with the economic freedoms and competition rules laid down by European Union law.

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5. Critical Analysis

The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, 2026) once again brings to the forefront one of the central debates in contemporary sports law: to what extent may international sports governing bodies exercise regulatory autonomy when their regulations produce economic effects on a market?

In the author’s view, the Court adopts a balanced approach. At no point does it declare the FIFA Football Agent Regulations (FFAR, 2022) invalid as a whole. Rather, it confines itself to interpreting the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union whose alleged infringement was raised by the German court. In other words, the CJEU does not replace FIFA in its regulatory role; instead, it reminds the federation that its regulatory powers must be exercised within the limits imposed by European Union law whenever the rules adopted produce effects on economic activities.

Corner of the Pitch | Photo: pixabay.com

Particular significance attaches to the Court’s characterisation of FIFA as an “association of undertakings” for the purposes of Article 101 TFEU (2010). This conclusion is consistent with an established line of case law and with a long-standing academic debate that has questioned the true economic nature of an organisation which, despite its formal status as a non-profit association, governs an industry worth billions of dollars each year. In this context, the Court’s analysis focuses not on FIFA’s legal form but on the economic effects that its decisions produce within the professional football market.

However, this does not mean that FIFA lacks the authority to regulate the activities of football agents. On the contrary, the continued growth of the sports intermediation market demonstrates the need for common rules capable of enhancing transparency, professional standards, and legal certainty in international transfers. It would be difficult to envisage a global system without an authority capable of establishing minimum standards applicable to the various stakeholders operating in this market.

For that very reason, it appears appropriate that FIFA itself should take the lead in developing such regulations. No other organisation possesses a deeper understanding of the day-to-day functioning of international football or of the particular relationships that exist between clubs, players, coaches, and agents. This expertise also explains why sports-related disputes have traditionally found a more appropriate forum in specialised bodies such as the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) rather than in ordinary courts that are less familiar with the realities of professional sport.

Nevertheless, the judgment makes it clear that FIFA’s regulatory autonomy is not absolute. Whenever sporting regulations begin to produce direct effects on economic markets, competition, or the freedom to provide services within the European Union, the exercise of that regulatory authority becomes subject to the constraints of EU law. In such circumstances, the review carried out by the Court of Justice does not constitute an undue interference with the organisation of sport but rather the application of the general principles of the European Union legal order to an activity with an undeniable economic dimension.

Another of the most significant aspects of the judgment lies in the analytical methodology adopted by the Court. On several occasions, the CJEU emphasises that not every regulatory restriction automatically amounts to an infringement of competition law. Before reaching such a conclusion, it is essential to examine the context, the objectives pursued by the regulation, and, in many cases, the concrete effects it produces on the market. In doing so, the Court avoids a purely abstract analysis and recognises that certain restrictions may be justified where they pursue legitimate objectives and are necessary, appropriate, and proportionate.

From this perspective, the judgment should not be interpreted as an institutional defeat for FIFA but rather as a reminder of the legal limits within which it must exercise its future regulatory powers. The Court’s message appears clear: FIFA may continue to regulate world football, but it must demonstrate that any restrictions it imposes pursue legitimate objectives and satisfy a strict test of necessity and proportionality.

This development is likely to require FIFA not only to revise the substance of its future regulations but also to reconsider the manner in which they are developed. Before introducing rules with significant economic implications, it will be necessary to strengthen consultation mechanisms with the various stakeholders—including agents, clubs, leagues, players, and representative organisations—in order to reduce conflicts and enhance the legitimacy of its decisions. In this regard, FIFA’s institutional response following the Diarra judgment, which led to the opening of discussions with organisations such as FIFPRO and other stakeholders in professional football, may well serve as a precedent for the aftermath of this latest ruling.

Ultimately, the principal lesson to be drawn from this judgment is that the autonomy of sport remains a fundamental principle of sports law, but it can no longer be regarded as an area immune from the application of European Union law whenever sporting regulations produce significant economic consequences. Rather than limiting the very existence of FIFA’s autonomy, the CJEU redefines the manner in which that autonomy may be exercised within a global market governed by the principles of competition, free movement, and the protection of fundamental rights.

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6. Conclusions

The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, 2026) represents one of the most significant decisions in the field of sports law in recent years. Its principal contribution lies in reaffirming that the regulatory autonomy of international sports governing bodies remains an essential principle for the organisation of sport. However, that autonomy is not without limits where the rules adopted produce economic effects capable of affecting competition, the freedom to provide services, or the rights guaranteed under European Union law.

Far from constituting a rejection of FIFA’s regulatory role, the judgment implicitly recognises the need for an authority capable of regulating a market as complex as that of football agents. It would be difficult to envisage an international system without common rules designed to ensure transparency, professional standards, and legal certainty in the transfer of players and coaches. Nevertheless, such rules must be developed in accordance with the principles of necessity, proportionality, and justification required by European Union law.

In this respect, the judgment is likely to influence the way in which FIFA develops its future regulations. Rather than unilaterally imposing rules with significant economic consequences, it appears increasingly necessary to strengthen consultation mechanisms with the various stakeholders involved. It is therefore no coincidence that, only a few hours after the judgment was delivered, FIFA’s Chief Legal Officer, Dr Emilio García Silvero, expressed his intention to convene representatives of football agents with a view to reaching a consensual solution. That response demonstrates that meaningful dialogue with the affected stakeholders may become an essential tool for enhancing the legitimacy of future regulatory reforms.

It is still too early to conclude that this judgment marks the beginning of a new era in sports law. Only the future development of the case law will determine the true scope of the principles established by the Court. Nevertheless, the judgment introduces an idea that is likely to shape future litigation: restrictions contained in sporting regulations cannot be assessed solely by reference to their objectives but must also be evaluated in light of their actual effects on the market. This methodological shift may ultimately prove to be one of the judgment’s most significant contributions.

Ultimately, if the judgment were to be summarised in a single proposition, it would be this: the Court of Justice does not limit the existence of sporting autonomy; rather, it limits the manner in which that autonomy may be exercised when sporting rules produce significant economic consequences. This will, in all likelihood, constitute the judgment’s most enduring legal legacy.

7. References

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